IPv6 Source Addresses


What Could Possibly Go Wrong?

Jen Linkova, furry@google.com


- Logging all IPv6 packets from reserved/ invalid sources entering Google network from Internet
- Collecting the data for a few days


Data Set:


- 2011:
 - 1.1M packets
 - 32.5K Unique IPs
- 2013:
 - 15M packets
 - 476K Unique IPs




Source Addresses Distribution, by Packets, %









%

ICMP Traffic Profile

- Users' Traffic
 Cho Requests
- Infrastructure
 - Time Exceeded
 - Packet Too Big
 - Destination Unreachable
 - > 99% 'Address Unreachable'

* Neighbor Discovery Redirects

Link-Local Unicast fe80::/10

	Packets	Unique	Address	Vendors (OUI)		
	(% of all packets)	Total	MAC48 based (*)	Known	Unknown	
2011	26198 (2%)	156	129 (82%)	24	2	
2013	11676 (0.08%)	35	32 (91%)	18	1	

* "Based on MAC-48": "U/L bit is set and "FF:FE octets present".

Other addresses look like privacy extensions or based on locally administered MAC-48.

Traffic Profile


- Majority of traffic is TCP (~90%)
- Non-TCP traffic:
 - 2011: mix of ICMP
 - destination unreachable
 - packet too big
 - time exceeded
 - ND redirects
 - 2013: traffic from TWO routers only

ND redirects to Google frontends IPs.

Neighbor Discovery Redirects

RFC 4861 - Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)

Source Address: MUST be the link-local address assigned to the interface from which this message is sent.Destination Address: The Source Address of the packet that triggered the redirect - MUST identify a neighbor



How Did They Get There?

- None of those packets are from devices directly connected to Google routers
- Packets with link-local source came from Internet - successfully routed
- RFC4007 "IPv6 Scoped Address Architecture"

Section 9, "Forwarding":

If transmitting the packet on the chosen next-hop interface would cause the packet to leave the zone of the source address, i.e., cross a zone boundary of the scope of the source address, then the packet is discarded.

Unique Local Unicast Addresses ULA fc00::/7

	Packets (% of total packets analyzed)	Prefixes			Addresses		IPs/ prefix (avg)
		Total count	Locally Assigned	Invalid ULAs a.k.a 'globally assigned'	Total count (% of total packets)	IEEE MAC48 based	
2011	271056 (24%)	652	644 (99%)	8 (1%)	2063 (6.0 %)	88 (4.27%)	~3
2013	7125395 (48.0 %)	15545	15518 (99.8%)	27 (0.2%)	108920 (23%)	1452 (1.3%)	~7

IPv6 is hard: There is some confusion between fc00::/7, fc::/7 and fc0::/7!

'U' Stands For 'Unique'...Really?

- What is the proper way to detect non-random GID?
 - highest octet is '0' or '1' OR
 - hex representation contains [a-f] or [0-9] only OR
 - hex representation contains 3 or less different symbols (excl. ':')
 - two octets are '0'
- Non-Random Prefixes Top List:
 - o fc00::/48
 - o fd00::/48
 - fdfd:cafe:cafe::/48
- Non-random ULA prefixes:
 - o 2011: 2.8%
 - o 2013: 0.7%

Site Local Addresses fec0::/10 (Deprecated Since 2004)

	Addresses (% of all unique IPs)	Prefixes	Packets (% of total packets)	Traffic Profile				
				TCP	ICMP Dest. Unreachable	ICMP Time Exceeded	UDP	
2011	16 (0.05%)	8	10497 (1%)	64%	1%	35%	< 0.1%	
2013	205 (0.04%)	21	55963 (0.4%)	40%	40%	20%	< 0.1%	

Traffic profile is different from ULA


Anomalies

5f00::/8

- ~1% of all logged packets: **3ffe:831f::/32**
 - Was used by Teredo on Windows machines
 - 100% of traffic is ICMP Echo Requests
- 0.01% of all logged packets are from actual 6bone block
 - 7 IP addresses detected
 - $\circ~$ 100% of traffic is TCP

IPv4-Mapped ::FFFF:0:0/96

- Used in the IPv6 basic API to denote IPv4 addresses
- Should NOT appear on the wire
- 2011/2013 ~0.1% of analyzed traffic




IPv4-Compatible ::/96

- Deprecated since 2006
- Should NOT appear on the wire
- 2011/2013 ~2% of analyzed traffic
- Most of encoded IPs are private
- Mostly (97%): ICMP Destination Unreachable

::/64 Subnet

- Very few packets from
 - o ::/**1**
 - :: (unspecified)
- Mystery Traffic:
 - Interface ID: 64 non-zero bits, NOT based on MAC48



What We DID NOT See

- Multicast Sources
- Very little traffic from random blocks
 addresses like 'a:a:a:a:a:a:a:a' are popular

Summary

- Address selection is still broken
- Things are getting better
- No explanation for some mystery packets
- Scoped Address Architecture is ignored ;(
- ..let alone BCP38...:-((

QUESTIONS?