Route Policy Verification

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BIG BROTHER
IS WATCHING
YOU!

Plan

1. Why we need route policy data?
BGP Route Prediction, AS Design

2. What is wrong with Route Policy from RR?
Physical link discovery, classterization

3. How have we made verification?
Active route policy discovery

4. Results
BGP Route Prediction, AS Design

Traffic generators

Internet

AS1

AS2

Inbound balancing

Traffic consumers

Internet

AS1 AS2

Outbound balancing

Traffic vector

Asymmetric!

Route Policy

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4. Results

BGP Route Prediction, AS Design

Outdated

From RIPE DB

aut-num: AS42366

remarks: Due to major changes this object is outdated at moment

Erroneous

Incompleteness

Often	Sometimes	Never
Accept Fliters	Prepend	ORIGIN
		EBGP vs IBGP
Local Pref	Med	IGP
		Route ID

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Outdated, errorneous and incomplete

3. How have we made verification?

Active route policy discovery

4. Results

BGP Route Prediction, AS Design

Route Policy Recovery

1. Imitation model of BGP decision process
2. AS relations tagging
3. Active verification

Result: Priority at every level of BGP decision process

AS Relations tagging

AS3 ⟷ AS4

p2p

AS2   AS5

AS1   AS6 ← AS7

Relations:

p2p = {AS3, AS4}

c2p = {(AS2, AS23, (AS5,AS4),
(AS1, AS2), (AS6, AS5), (AS7,AS5)}

AS Relations tagging

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
AS Relations tagging

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Active Verification : example

ASXXX ⬅ - - - - - - - - - - - ⬤

Traceroute
One remote node – one path

# Active Verification : example

Echo request

Echo reply

AS1

ASXXX

AS2

Ping –R with source from ASXXX
One remote node – count(neighbors) * path

Verification Data

radar.qrator.net

1. AS Relation typing;
2. Traffic flow prediction from Tier-1 providers;
3. Radar Monitor: static and dynamic route loops, DoS amplifires, botnet amps.

Botnet Map

Top Countries ▾

| CODE	COUNTRY	BOT COUNT
ALL COUNTRIES		65922
RU	RUSSIA	6047
DE	GERMANY	4220
VN	VIETNAM	3815
IR	IRAN	3209
PH	PHILIPPINES	2376
CN	CHINA	2317
BR	BRAZIL	2298
ID	INDONESIA	2237
KZ	KAZAKHSTAN	2224
TH	THAILAND	2031

QRATOR.NET

21

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
Active route policy discovery

4. Verification Results

BGP Route Prediction, AS Design

Customers as Criterion

1. Customers has global visibility unlike peering relations

2. Pref(customer) > Pref(not_customer)

Completeness: links

Amount

Completeness: links

Percentage

Bar chart showing Export Policy and Import Policy percentages for Arin, Apnic, and RIPE.

Completeness: pref

RIPE

Bar chart showing PREF; 12211 and Route Policy; 27312. X-axis from 0 to 30000.

Erroneous: pref

$$good = count(pref(customer) > pref(!\,customer))$$
$$bad = count(pref(customer) < pref(!\,customer))$$

$$\frac{\sum_{AS} \dfrac{bad}{good + bad}}{count(AS)} = 68\%$$

C2P description

Legend: No info, No pref, Error pref, Good ones

No info: 41%
No pref: 26%
Error pref: 22%
Good ones: 11%

Results

1. Route Policy data from RR is greatly outdated, incomplete and full of errors. It can't be used for AS Design or for traffic engineering purposes;

2. Mathematical models could be used for route policy recovery with high precision.

Qrator Radar

radar.qrator.net